In this paper we analyze a two period contest in which agents may become bankrupt at the end of the …rst period. A bankrupt agent is excluded from the contest in the second period of the game. We investigate the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We distinguish between a borrowing equilibrum where at least an agent might be bankrupt and a non borrowing equilibrium where no agent is bankrupted. We prove that the former occurs when the agent taking loans is relatively poor. This is the despair e¤ect where severely handicapped agents take actions that are risky. We also show conditions under which both kind of equilibria overlap or not. We provide an example in which no equilibrium exists.
Introduction
The theory of contests studies con ‡icts where agents spend e¤ort in order to obtain a prize. In static contests, aggregate e¤ort is maximized when agents are identical. So if I play tennis against Nadal, I will make very little e¤ort -because my chances to win are very small-and Nadal will make very little e¤ort too because he does not need much e¤ort to defeat me. In dynamic contests this translates into the Discouragement E¤ ect where lagging players make little e¤ort or throw the towel -because they will loose with a high probability-and players with a large advantage will do little e¤ort too because they need not much to win, see Konrad (2012) and the references therein.
However, in some dynamic contests, the contrary may well happen. Suppose that in the Champions League, a soccer team after losing in the …rst half of the …rst round is o¤ered a drug that will increase performance in the second half but, with same probability the drug will be discovered and the team disquali…ed. If the losing team is defeated by, say 1-0, it might reject the o¤er on the grounds that it is too risky. But if the team is losing 3-0 it might accept the drug because the chances that it can overturn the result without extra help are slim. The result will be more e¤ort in the second half of the game but perhaps less e¤ort in the long run because if the illegal drug is discovered the team will be disquali…ed. Thus heterogeneity in players may well increase aggregate e¤ort, at least in some periods. We call this situation the Despair E¤ ect because handicapped players may …nd optimal to take risky actions that will not be sensible if these players were not handicapped.
In this paper, we present a two period complete information contest in which two agents are endowed with money and they can get extra money in a capital market. 1 Potential lenders can either invest in the safe asset or in a contestant. The latter is risky because if this contestant does not win, investors get no return. The capital market equalizes expected returns of both assets. Thus, agents with shallow pockets may overcome this handicap by raising loans money and competing in more equal terms with agents with deep pockets. Examples of this situation are wars among empires for a resource and repeated competition among …rms for public (i.e. aircraft for US navy) or private (building construction) procurement. 2 A crucial assumption of our model is that a contestant unable to repay the loan will be excluded in the second period contest. This assumption is an idealization of the problems faced by a country or a …rm unable to repay its debts. It has been backed by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) in a strategic …nance setup and has been used by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) in their analysis of sovereign debt. In the next section we will discuss this assumption. For the time being let us recall Mr. Micawber's famous, and often quoted, recipe for happiness:
"Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen [shillings] and six [pence] , result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery." This is explained by the fact that, as it turns out in the novel, the slightest debt will put the debtor in jail, no matter how small. Another example of our assumption is the recent UEFA proposal to enforce budget balance among all clubs playing European competitions. To play there, clubs must prove they have no outstanding payments to players, to each other or to the tax authorities.
We distinguish between two scenarios. In the …rst, one of the agents (the rich agent) has very large money endowments so he never takes a loan and never faces risk of liquidation. The other agent (the poor agent) has limited money endowment, he might get a loan so he either wins the contest or face liquidation. We call this scenario Rich Man-Poor Man. We prove that the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this game is unique and can be of two, mutually exclusive, types:
1. The poor agent …nances entirely his expenses with his endowments. We call this the non borrowing equilibrium.
2. The poor agent …nances part of his expenses in the capital market. We call this the borrowing equilibrium.
In the non borrowing equilibrium both agents spend less than in the standard one shot Nash equilibrium (NE). In the borrowing equilibrium both agents spend more than they do in the one shot NE. The latter can be seen as a kind of predatory equilibrium where the rich agent spends a large quantity of money which drags the poor agent into borrowing which in turn, given the risk of bankruptcy of the latter, increases the expected prize received by the rich in the second period.
The (non) borrowing equilibrium exists when the poor agent is (resp. is not) very poor and he does not care (resp. he cares) much about the future. The role of discount is clear: If an agent does not care much about the future, the risk of bankruptcy has small payo¤ consequences so he is inclined to get a loan. The role of the endowment is precisely the despair e¤ect. It comes from the fact that a loan allows the poor agent to compete on equal footing with the rich agent. When both agents have similar money endowments, a loan does not mean much to the poor agent, in terms of helping him to compete in the …rst period, and brings a risky outcome. We also show that for intermediate values of the poor's endowment and the discount rate a SPNE may not exist.
In the second scenario, both agents are identical, have limited endowments and may access the capital market. We call this scenario Poor Man-Poor Man. This scenario is meant to capture the polar situation to the one in the previous section and to see the impact of the deep pocket in equilibrium outcome. Now we have two equilibria one in which both agents do not borrow and another in which both agents borrow. We show that these equilibria have properties that closely match those encountered in the Rich Man-Poor Man scenario. The only di¤erence is that both equilibria can coexists. Thus the impact of the size of pockets appears to be technical in nature, namely about the existence and uniqueness of equilibria but not about the properties of the latter.
Our paper is related with other papers in which the result of early rounds may encourage contestants to make more e¤ort. Sela (2011) considers a race in which the loser cares about the magnitude of the defeat and shows that the loser of the …rst battle may be encouraged to increase e¤ort in the second battle to avoid a dishonorable defeat. Beviá and Corchón (2013) consider a two period contest when the strength in the second contest depends on the result of the …rst contest.
Thus, winning in the …rst round has an impact on the outcome in the second round so players have an extra incentive to spend e¤ort. Consequently, the discouragement e¤ect holds only when the di¤erence between players is su¢ ciently large. Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2000) study the e¤ect of war on paci…cation in subsequent periods. The despair e¤ect considered in this paper refers to cases in which e¤ort today might bring disastrous consequences in the future. Examples of this e¤ect abound in the military history from the dictum "caja o faja" (co¢ n or belt, a military regalia only wore by marshals), which refers to low rank o¢ cers commanding almost suicidal attacks that in case of success will bring big promotions, to battles like Leite Gulf in 1944 in which the Japanese navy committed almost all available ships to defend crucial oil supply lines to Japan. The famous dictum in the "Communist Manifesto" (1848) that "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains.
They have a world to win" may be interpreted as another example even though, understandably, Marx and Engels did not emphasize the dire consequences on proletarians of defeat.
The rest of the paper goes as follows: section 2 describes the model and states some preliminary results. The …rst and the second scenarios previously described are analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively.
The Model
There are two periods and two agents (also called contestants). In each period, say t, agents contest for a prize of value V by spending a quantity of a resource that we call money and denote by G t i where i 2 f1; 2g denotes the agent. In period one agent i is endowed with M i units of money.
Without loss of generality we assume that M 1 M 2 . If G 1 i > M i agent i can borrow from a credit market where money can be invested either in …nancing the contestants or in a riskless asset which after a period yields r units per unit investment. The interest r is determined exogenously. An investment of a unit of money in the expenses made by contestant i yields s with probability p i and 0 with probability 1 p i . Thus, assuming that investors are risk neutral, the expected return is p i s. If the capital market is competitive we should have that
Thus if the "risky" investment is a safe deal, p i = 1 and then s = r. And when the risky investment is very risky, p i = 0 and then s = 1.
Let us now write the expected payo¤s of contestant i who fully …nanced G 1 i units of money through the capital market and spent them in the contest. With probability p i it wins V but it has to pay sG 1 i . With probability 1 p i it loses and it has no money to pay. Thus expected pro…ts for contestant i are
If the expenses are …nanced with the endowments, they have an opportunity cost of r. Thus, in any case, equation (2.2) represents the payo¤ of contestant i. In the rest of the paper without loss of generality we set r = 1.
In each period there are three stages de…ned as follows:
1. Agents decide the amount of expenses.
If this amount exceeds the available money, they borrow the di¤erence, i.e. if agent i spends
We emphasize that the decisions on expenditure and borrowing are simultaneous, see our comments later.
2. The prize is awarded.
Let p t i be the probability that agent i obtains the price in period t. In each period the probability of winning the contest is given by a Contest Success Function (CSF) written as
where
We also assume that the CSF is symmetric, that is p i (x; y) = p j (y; x); homogeneous of degree zero, i.e. the units in which expenses are measured do not a¤ect the result. Our …nal assumption is a kind of Inada condition, namely that @p i (y; y)=G t i tends to zero when y goes to in…nity, and it tends to a number greater than 1=V when y goes to zero. An example of a CSF satisfying all these conditions is the Tullock CSF, namely
3. Bankruptcy rules. If the agent was in debt and did not win the prize, no one wants to lend him anymore so he is excluded from the contest in period 2.
This assumption is, of course, an idealization. Couwenberg (2001) We take this view to the limit assuming that bankrupted nations disappear from the contest arena. In the conclusions we retake this discussion and propose a more general set up.
We say that an agent is active in the second period if he can participate in the contest. If an agent loses the contest in the …rst period, he will be active in the second period i¤
agent wins the contest in the …rst period he will be active in the second period i¤
Finally we assume that:
4 Second period. If in this period there is only one active agent, this agent wins the prize at no cost. If there are no active agents, the prize is not awarded. If two agents are active they compete like in the …rst period. If an agent cannot repay the loan, this has no consequences because the world ends in this period. Therefore, in the second period if both agents are active they spend the same money and obtain the same payo¤ which we denote by .
In period t, expected payo¤ of agent i is
Expected payo¤ for agent i for the whole game is denoted by i and de…ned as
where 2 (0; 1] is the discount rate, common to both agents.
Note that bankruptcy in the second period does not have consequences on the exclusion of agents since there are no more contests to play. Thus, all the action occurs in period one and consequently we focus our analysis in this period. Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SP N E). In the Appendix 1 we gather some technical implications of the assumptions above that will be used later on in the proofs of the main results.
In the next section we focus on the case where agent 1 can pay out of his endowments any conceivable expense but agent 2 cannot. We will call this case "Rich Man -Poor Man". The case in which both agents are constrained ("Poor Man-Poor Man") will be analyzed in the subsequent section. 4 
Rich Man -Poor Man Scenario
In this section we assume that agent 1 -the rich agent-has a very large quantity of money so he will never be constrained, and agent 2 -the poor agent-has not.
Consider a game in which payo¤ functions are 1 1 and 1 2 (see 2.6) and there is no …nancial constraints. Let the best reply function of player i be denoted by RO i (G j ). We call the Nash equilibrium of this game the one shot Nash equilibrium. Under our assumptions this equilibrium exists, is unique and symmetric (see Appendix 1). Let G be the expense of an agent in the one shot Nash equilibrium. For future reference let be the one shot Nash equilibrium payo¤s.
We assume that the poor agent cannot …nance G out of his pocket, i.e. M 2 < G. Consequently the poor agent has to decide if he wants to borrow or not. This case is analytically convenient as a start because it simpli…es the handling of the …nancial constraints. It correspond to the "deep pocket" case which has been considered in oligopolistic markets, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and the references therein. It has been argued that deep pockets yield predation. We will consider the validity of such a conclusion in our set up.
There are two possible kinds of equilibria of the dynamic game: those in which the poor agent does not borrow -equilibrium without borrowing-and those in which the poor agent borrowsequilibrium with borrowing.
We start with the case in which the poor agent does not borrow in equilibrium. One would expect that this equilibrium exists when the money endowments of the poor agent are large (but smaller than G, of course). Our …rst proposition shows that this conjecture is true. Proof. See Appendix 2.
The proof establishes that when M 2 tends to zero, borrowing is better than no borrowing because with the latter option the poor agent has no chance of winning. Conversely when M 2 is close to G borrowing makes little di¤erence and it implies a risk so borrowing is not a good option. The intermediate value theorem tells us the existence of a point in which both options are indi¤erent. And since poor man payo¤s are increasing with M 2 , the result follows.
We note the following:
In a non-borrowing equilibrium both agents spend less than if they were unconstrained.
For the poor agent this is by de…nition and for the rich agent it follows from (2.4). Thus hard …nancial constraints make all agents spend less because they occur only when strategies are strategic complements.
A di¤erent question would be to consider a given endowment of the poor agent and see if there is a , say , such that an equilibrium without borrowing exists for all 2 ( ; 1). This would be reasonable because for ' 1 agents care dearly about the consequences of a possible bankruptcy in the …rst period so they prefer the safe option of not borrowing. However this concern may be not enough to deter the poor agent from deviating from the non-borrowing situation as shown in the following example.
Example 1. Assume that the CSF is given by (2.5). The equilibrium in the one shot game is given by:
Note …rst that if agent 2 is constrained, M 2 < V =4: To show the existence of a non borrowing equilibrium we have to show that G 1 2 = M 2 and
The payo¤ of the poor agent if he does not borrow is:
If he deviates and decides to borrow, he will risk bankruptcy but will increase his probability of winning in the …rst period. Then his continuation payo¤ is
A non borrowing equilibrium exists if and only if the payo¤s when the poor agent borrows are smaller than the payo¤s when he does not borrow, namely
the necessary and su¢ cient condition (3.5) can be written as:
Recall that since agent 2 is constrained, M 2 < V =4; that is, q > 4: If = 1 (which is the most favorable case for the existence of a non borrowing equilibrium), equation (3.6) implies that q must be smaller than 13: 09, that is, the initial wealth of the poor agent should be at least 7% of the value of the prize. Thus, when the poor agent is indeed very poor the strategy of borrowing and risking bankruptcy pays o¤.
Note that (3.6) de…nes q as an increasing function of . Thus, under a Tullock CSF, non borrowing equilibrium arises as a combination of patient agents and the poor agent not being very poor.
We now turn our attention to equilibrium with borrowing. Firstly we note that, given M 2 , when ' 0 an equilibrium with borrowing exists because the poor agent can enhance his chances of winning the …rst period contest by borrowing and he does not care about the possible consequences of the second period. So let us work out the converse: one would expect that for a given when the poor agent is indeed very poor he will choose to borrow regardless of the probability of bankruptcy.
Our next proposition shows that, under an additional assumption, this is indeed the case.
LetG 1 1 ;G 1 2 be the Nash equilibrium if the poor agent were forced to borrow. This equilibrium exists under our assumptions, see Appendix 2. Let B 2 (G 1 1 ;G 1 2 ) be poor player payo¤s in such equilibrium.
equilibrium with borrowing exists. In a borrowing equilibrium the rich agent will make more e¤ort than the poor agent.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The strategy of the proof of Proposition 2 is akin to Proposition 1. The result on e¤orts follows from the fact that the payo¤ of the rich agent is larger when the poor agent has a possibility of being bankrupt. Consequently the rich agent is more aggressive in the …rst period. This is the "Shadow E¤ect" where the anticipation of a future weaker contender makes strong players more aggressive (see Brown and Minor (2011) ).
In Proposition 2 we prove the existence of an equilibrium with borrowing given that B 2 (G 1 1 ;G 1 2 ) > . Notice that, givenG 1 1 ; by not borrowing, agent 2 can always guarantee himself at least (expending nothing in the …rst period will give him this payo¤). Thus, if by borrowing he get less than that, an equilibrium with borrowing will not exist. With a Tullock CSF for instance, if = 1;
> does not hold. In order to further understand this issue let us again work out the case for the Tullock CSF.
Example 2. Assume that the CSF is given by (2.5). If an equilibrium with borrowing exists, expenses in the …rst period are given by:
Solving (3.7), we get that
Both G 1 1 and G 1 2 are increasing in : Since for = 0; G 1 2 = V =4 > M 2 ; agent 2 is borrowing. The prize in case of borrowing for the rich agent is bigger because with certain probability he will be the only one surviving in the second period and thus,
The probabilities for each player of winning the contest in the …rst period are:
; and
Thus, the payo¤ for the poor agent if he borrows is: 
Dividing by M 2 and letting q = V =M 2 as before we get
Given (3.12), let us see that agent 2 does not have incentives to deviate. If he plays M 2 given that agent 1 is playing G 1 1 ; his payo¤ will be:
Thus, he will not deviate if N B
2
< B 2 or equivalently 1
(3.14)
Condition (3.14) says that, for a given q, when the poor agent does not care much about the future (i.e. is close to 0), he may well risk bankruptcy. Alternatively, given , the poorer the agent is relatively to V (i.e. q is high), the more likely he prefers the risky strategy of borrowing resources.
Thus, the borrowing equilibrium arises as a combination of impatient agents and the poor agent having really small endowments. Another interesting feature of this equilibrium is that the expenses of both players are larger than those in the one shot equilibrium. Thus, in this equilibrium agent 1 challenges agent 2 with a large expense and agent 2 accepts the challenge. Finally note that when q is very large (M 2 small) an equilibrium with borrowing exists i¤ ( =4) < (1 + 1 4 ) 3 =(2 + ) 2 which does not hold for close to 1. Thus, without the condition that
with borrowing does not exists.
In Figure 1 , the area below the dotted line (which is very close to the axis) corresponds to condition (3.12) and the area below the solid line corresponds to condition (3.14). Thus, for any (q; ) in the area below the solid line an equilibrium with borrowing exist (recall that the poor agent is constrained only when q > 4). The area above the dash line (3.6) corresponds to the space of parameters (q; ) for which an equilibrium without borrowing exists. It is easy to check the following remark Remark 2. Assume that the CSF is given by (2.5). Then equilibrium is unique.
To end this section note that for any pair (q; ) between both lines in Figure 1 there is no a SPNE in pure strategies. In Appendix 3 we present an example of non existence.
Summing up, in the rich man-poor man case equilibrium can be of two kinds: either the poor agent accepts his fate and spends less than if …nancial constraints would not exist (equilibrium without borrowing) or he risks bankruptcy (equilibrium with borrowing). The …rst equilibrium occurs when concerns for the future are important and the poor agent is not very poor. The second equilibrium exist in the opposite circumstances and, when the CSF is Tullock, is characterized by both agents spending more than in the one shot equilibrium. This is because the rich agents has incentives to force the poor agent to accept a large risk of bankruptcy. Thus, this is kind of predatory equilibrium like when US forced USSR in the early eighties to a large military expenditure which accelerated the demise of the socialist state. For intermediate values of concern about the future and wealth of the poor agent, an equilibrium might not exists.
Poor Man -Poor Man Scenario
In this section we study the case where no agent can pay out of his endowments the expenses corresponding to the one shot game, M 1 < G and M 2 < G. To keep things simple we focus here in the case in which both agents have identical endowments, thus M 1 = M 2 . This case is somehow the polar case to the one considered in the previous section, where the asymmetry arising from endowments was maximal.
In the rest of this section we analyze the two possible equilibria.
Non Borrowing Equilibrium
Here we prove a result akin to Proposition 1 in the previous section. The proof is shown in Appendix 4. Again the result hinges on the fact that when M is relatively large borrowing is a risky option that brings little good and conversely when M is small borrowing is the best way to compete.
As in the previous section, we work out in detail the case in which the CSF is Tullock.
Example 3. In a non borrowing equilibrium, given that agents are identically constrained, both agents expend their entire resources in the …rst period. Both agents survive in the second period, therefore their continuation payo¤ is identical for both of them and equal to V =4: Thus,
If agent i deviates and borrows, his continuation payo¤ changes once he faces bankruptcy with some probability. Thus, by playing
The most pro…table deviation will be to play the best reply of i against M; that is
An equilibrium with non borrowing will exist if and only if
The above inequality can be written as
Summing up, and equilibrium with non borrowing exists if and only if (4.5) holds.
Equilibrium with borrowing.
Suppose that both agents borrow. In this case both are facing a probability of bankruptcy in the second period. Therefore, with probability p 1 i agent i will be the only one surviving in the game and his continuation payo¤ will be p 1 1 V:
Now we prove a result similar to Proposition 2 in the previous section.
Proposition 4. Suppose both agents have identical endowments. Let be such that i (G;G)
: There exists M B ( ) 2 (0; G) such that an equilibrium without borrowing exist if and only if
M M B ( ).
The proof is in Appendix 3. The intuition is as in Proposition 2.
As before, to get intuition, let us assume that the CSF is Tullock.
is an equilibrium with borrowing.
If agent i deviates and does not borrow, that is, plays G 1 i M; he will not face bankruptcy and with probability p i (G 1 i ;Ĝ) he will be the only one surviving in the game and he will get V and, with probability 1 p i (G 1 i ;Ĝ); both agents will survive and he will get V =4: Thus, if he deviates by playing G 1 i M; his payo¤ will be:
First of all, let us see that by best replying according to N B i toĜ without taking into account the constraints, let us say G 1 i , is bigger than M . Thus, the best possible deviation will be to play M:
Using the value ofĜ and that V =M = q; we get that r
is equivalent to r 
Conclusions and further extensions
In this paper we have presented a model of a two period contest where agents have money endowments and may borrow money. We assume that inability to repay the loan carries the disappearance of this agent. We have shown that relatively poor agents might take loans. Thus handicapped agents may take actions that endanger their survival in the long run but which, if successful, reduce substantially the handicap. We have called this the Despair E¤ ect and we have shown that it exists in two polar scenarios: Rich Man-Poor Man where an agent has unlimited endowments and Poor Man-Poor Man where both agents are identical and have relatively small endowments.
Many questions remain to understand fully the Despair E¤ ect. A natural extension, especially when the interpretation is that contestants are …rms, is that agents compete an undetermined number of times for a prize of value V . Now …rms have the possibility of colluding by, for instance, coordinating such that only one …rm shows up in every contest. Suppose …rm 1 shows up in odd periods and …rm 2 shows up in even periods. Thus discounted pro…ts are respectively V =(1 ) 2
and V =(1 ) 2 . If a …rm breaks the collusive agreement wins in this period but the other …rm will play non-cooperatively in the rest of the game. Assume a Tullock CSF. To start with the simplest case assume that both …rms have zero endowments (i.e. a limit case of the Poor Man-Poor Man scenario) and that money cannot be transferred between periods. If a …rm breaks the agreement today wins V and if both …rms will play non-cooperatively tomorrow in the second period they win in expected terms V =4. But since one of the …rms is bankrupted in this period with probability 1=2 the deviator wins V =2 in expected terms in the remaining game. Thus the expected payo¤ for a deviator is V + V =4 + V 2 =2. Collusion is an equilibrium i¤
or equivalently
which is impossible. This is due to the fact that from the second period on, a …rm is a monopolist (with probability :5) so breaking the collusive agreement yields a big reward. This example shows that the introduction of …nancial constraints changes completely the picture and, in this case, makes collusion impossible if only trigger strategies are used.
Finally we assumed two agents, a very speci…c bankruptcy rule and a stylized capital market.
All these assumptions raise issues that must be considered in further research.
Appendix 1: Auxiliary Results
In this section we gather results that we will use in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
In what follows we drop the time superindex whenever does not create confusion.
If the contest were played once and agents were not constrained by money endowments, the best reply function of agent i would be given by the …rst order condition
We denote this best reply function by RO i (G j ). For instance if the CSF is given by (2.5)
Totally di¤erentiating (6.1) and using (2.4),
Thus the best reply in the unconstrained one shot game is …rst increasing (strategic complementarity) and then decreasing (strategic substitution). Our assumptions on p i (:) imply that this is also the case for the general p i (:)
A one shot Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a pair ( G i ; G j ) such that G i 2 RO i ( G j ), i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6 = j: Under our assumptions, a one shot NE exists, is unique and symmetric, i.e. G i = G j = G (see for example Proposition 1 in Corchón (2000)). Also each agent wins the contest with probability 1=2 and both agents receive the same payo¤ which, as we said at the end of point 4 above, we denote by . From (6.3) in such equilibrium it must be that
Property (6.4) plus (2.4) imply the following:
This is because by de…ning
For future reference we note that, if the prize were valuated di¤erently by each contestant, say in V 1 and V 2 units respectively, in the one shot Nash equilibrium, (G 1 ; G 2 ); we will have
by homogeneity of degree zero. Thus, in equilibrium
which given (2.4) implies that
The player with the larger (resp. smaller) valuation regards strategies as strategic complements (resp. substitutes).
In the sequel we will compare the best reply of an agent in two di¤erent games which only di¤er in the agents'value of the prize. In this case, the best reply of agent i to G j when the value of the prize for agent i is V i is denoted by
This follows directly from the …rst order conditions and the assumption @ 2 p i (G i ; G j )=@G 2 i < 0: Finally, we assume that
Assumption (6.9) holds for Tullock CSF.
7. Appendix 2. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Preliminaries
Let us study the best reply of agent 1 in the …rst period. We will refer to this best reply as RD 1 (G 1 2 ): If the poor agent does not borrow, G 1 2 M 2 ; both agents are active in the second period, they will get in the second period, and thus the best reply of agent 1 will be RO 1 (G 1 2 ): However, if the poor agent decides to borrow, his continuation payo¤ will be di¤erent from the non borrowing case because with probability p 2 he will be active in the second period and with probability p 1 he will be bankrupt. Thus, the expected payo¤ for agent 1 will be:
Note that this two period game is equivalent to a one shot game in which the prize for the rich agent is (1 + )V which is larger than V .
The best reply of agent 1 is now given by the …rst order condition:
We denote this best reply by RD B 1 (G 1 2 ) where B refers to the fact that the poor agent is borrowing. Summarizing, the dynamic best reply for agent 1 is:
For the poor agent, the constraint agent, if
Otherwise, he will decide to borrow or not depending on the expected gains from borrowing. If he borrows, his expected payo¤ will be
where G 1 2 is the unique solution of the …rst order condition
We denote this best reply by RD B 2 (G 1 1 ). In this case, again, the two period game is equivalent to a one shot game in which the prize for the poor agent is V + . Note that this prize is less than the prize for agent 1; ((1 + )V ). This implies that agent 1 will make, in a borrowing equilibrium, more e¤ort than the poor agent. The payo¤ of the rich agent is larger when the poor agent has a possibility of being bankrupt. Consequently the rich agent is more aggressive in the …rst period. This is the "Shadow E¤ect" where the anticipation of a future weaker contender makes strong players more aggressive (see Brown and Minor (2011) ).
If he does not borrow, his expected payo¤ will be
Summarizing, the dynamic best reply for the poor agent is:
: (7.6)
Proof of Proposition 1
An equilibrium without borrowing will exist if and only if
This function is continuous in M 2 . Note that by strict concavity of expected payo¤s
Let us see …rst that when M 2 tends to zero,
Secondly, let us show that F (M 2 ) is positive when M 2 tends to G: Recall that G is the equilibrium e¤ort for both players in the one shot game without any constraints considerations. Thus,
Therefore, when M 2 tends to G; F (M 2 ) is positive.
Summarizing,
By the intermediate value theorem, there exist M N B 2 ( ) such that F (M N B 2 ( )) = 0: Finally, let us see that F (M 2 ) is increasing in M 2 : Denoting by F 0 (M 2 ) the derivative of F ( ) with respect to M 2 , we have that
Thus, (7.16) holds and consequently F 0 (M 2 ) 0:
Therefore, M N B 2 ( ) is unique in (0; G) and for all M 2 M N B 2 ( ) we have an equilibrium without borrowing.
Proof of Proposition 2
. Under our assumptions on p i (:); (G 1 1 ;G 1 2 ) exist. Recall that when agent 2 borrows, the game can be reinterpreted as one where agents have di¤erent valuations of the prize. Concretely,
That is, strategies are strategic complements for agent 1 and strategic substitutes for agent 2:
( ) an equilibrium with borrowing exists.
Given M 2 2 (0; RO 2 (G 1 1 )); an equilibrium with borrowing will exist if and only if Finally, notice that, by non borrowing, agent 2 can always guarantee himself at least (expending nothing in the …rst period will give him this payo¤). Thus, if by borrowing he always get less than that, an equilibrium with borrowing will not exist.
Appendix 3. Non existence of equilibrium in the Poor Man-Rich Man scenario
Assume that the CSF is given by (2.5). Let V = 100; = 0:5; and M 2 = 10. In order to simplify notation we denote the expenses of agents 1 and 2 in the …rst period as G 1 and G 2 . The best reply function for agent 1 is:
For the poor agent 
If he does not borrow, his expected payo¤ is given by
So, he will borrow if G 1 is such that In what follows we represent by a dashed line the best reply of agent 1 and the best reply of the poor agent by a solid line. Clearly, there is no a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Appendix 4. Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
Here we gather the proofs corresponding to the results obtained in the poor man-poor man scenario.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let M < G: In the poor man-poor man case where both agents have identical endowments, if an equilibrium without borrowing exists, it should be such that 
That is, even the best possible deviation when agent i borrows and face bankruptcy, is not pro…table. Without loss of generality, we do the analysis for agent 1. Let 
and
Summarizing, Finally, let us see that F (M ) is increasing in M: Denoting by F 0 (M ) the derivative of F ( ) with respect to M , we have that
(9.5)
(9.7)
Given that @ B 1 (Ĝ 1 1 ; M )=@G 1 2 = (@p 1 (Ĝ 1 1 ; M )=@G 1 2 )(V + ) = ( @p 2 (Ĝ 1 1 ; M )=@G 1 2 )(V + ): Let (G ; G ) be the Nash equilibrium of the game with payo¤s i (G 1 ; G 2 ) = p i (G 1 ; G 2 )(V + ) G i without constraints considerations. Since V + > V; G > G: Furthermore, sinceĜ 1 1 = RD B 1 (M ); and M < G < G ;Ĝ 1 1 < G : Thus, we are in the strategic complements zone, and there, the best reply of agent 2 toĜ 1 1 in this game is greater thanĜ 1 1 and therefore, greater than M: Thus, 
Proof of Proposition 4
If both agents borrow, who ever wins the prize in the …rst period gets the entire prize in the second period without e¤ort. Thus, the payo¤ will be i (G To complete this part note that if M B ( ) < G; we already have the result (that will be the case if for example G 1 < G): If M B ( ) > G; then for all M < G we have an equilibrium with borrowing.
Appendix 5. Coexistence of borrowing and non borrowing equilibria
In order to gain intuition on the situation where both kind of equilibria coexist, we present the following example.
Example 5. Suppose that V = 80; = 1; M 1 = M 2 = 10 and q = 8: Both agents are constrained.
In order to simplify notation we denote the expenses of agents 1 and 2 in the …rst period as G 1 and G 2 . Since both agents are identical, their best reply functions are identical too. So we have an equilibrium without borrowing when both agents spend 10 and another equilibrium with borrowing where both agents spend 40. The …rst equilibrium is somehow not very robust because if, say, player 1 chooses 10 + " (" > 0 but very small) the best reply of player 2 is far away from 10. But this equilibrium is robust if endowments vary a little.
